




The Effects of Directors’ Exploratory, Transformative and Exploitative Learning on 





While directors’ knowledge represents a crucial resource for strategizing on boards, little is 
known how knowledge of individual directors becomes deployed behind the doors of the 
boardroom. Drawing on the concept of absorptive capacity, we develop a model that explores 
how directors’ explorative, transformative and exploitative learning affects boards’ strategic 
involvement. Using large-scale survey data, our findings indicate that learning helps to ex-
plain how directors’ knowledge leads to higher levels of strategic involvement. Moreover, we 
find that learning processes mutually reinforce each other and have complementary effects on 
boards’ strategic involvement. Our study contributes to the board and absorptive capacity lit-
eratures by demonstrating that learning processes are interconnected with each other and rep-









Boards’ strategic involvement refers to the extent to which boards engage in shaping the con-
tent, process, and conduct of strategy (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), and represents an im-
portant determinant of directors’ contributions to corporate value creation. Strategic involve-
ment has been shown to influence firms’ decision behaviors (Nielsen and Huse, 2010), includ-
ing for example organizational ambidexterity (Heyden et al., 2015) and innovation (Torchia, 
Calabrò and Huse, 2011). Whereas early studies were skeptical concerning directors’ contri-
butions to strategy and there was a dearth of knowledge regarding its antecedents (Pugliese et 
al., 2009), more recent literature suggests that strategic decisions greatly benefit from direc-
tors’ industry-specific knowledge (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009), experience from serving 
as a top executive (Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 2014) and specialized task-specific expertise 
(McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 2008).  
Yet the processes by which boards make use of individual directors’ knowledge have 
not yet been completely understood. Process losses (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) and cognitive 
constraints (Rindova, 1999) often prevent directors from applying their knowledge in a strate-
gic decision-making context. Forbes and Milliken (1999) made an important distinction be-
tween the presence and use of knowledge, arguing that the latter requires high degrees of mu-
tual respect and collective learning among directors. While there is some empirical support 
for this suggestion (Minichilli et al., 2012; Zattoni, Gnan and Huse, 2015), and research 
demonstrates that directors who actively participate in strategic decision-making tend to learn 
behavioral procedures more deeply (Westphal and Zajac, 2013), not much theoretical reason-
ing exists on how learning enables boards to explore and transform their available knowledge 
and apply it to strategic tasks. Notwithstanding the few studies that adopt a learning perspec-
tive in this context (McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 2008; Tuschke, Sanders and 




about how learning processes relate to each other and affect board’s strategic decision-making 
in concert.  
In this study, we ask the following question: “How does directors’ exploratory, trans-
formative and exploitative learning affect boards’ strategic involvement?”. Theoretically, we 
draw on the concept of absorptive capacity to explain how boards obtain, share, and apply 
individual directors’ knowledge to strategic matters. Absorptive capacity refers to the ability 
to explore, transform, and exploit new information and knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; Zahra and George, 2002) and has been shown to be a valuable construct to explain how 
firms make use of their resources for strategic applications (Ebersberger and Herstad, 2011; 
Tortoriello, 2015). We argue that absorptive capacity and its focus on knowledge gathering, 
sharing, and exploiting from learning shares parallels with utilizing directors’ knowledge 
(Zahra, Filatotchev and Wright, 2009), and allows for a finer-grained explanation of how 
knowledge leads to strategic involvement. Additionally, in line with the absorptive capacity 
literature (Todorova and Durisin, 2007; Zahra and George, 2002), we suggest that multiple 
learning processes are mutually reinforcing (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006), and the joint 
adoption of all learning processes may be greater than the sum of benefits obtained from the 
isolated adoption of single ones (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995).  
We test our arguments using large-scale survey data from Norwegian boards. Norwe-
gian boards tend to have an active role in shaping the content, process, and conduct of strate-
gy (Zattoni, Gnan and Huse, 2015) that can foster discussions to absorb the knowledge of 
individual directors (Cadiz, Sawyer and Griffith, 2009). Our study makes two important con-
tributions. First, by introducing the concept of absorptive capacity into research on boards, we 
provide theoretical insights into how individual directors’ knowledge leads to higher levels of 
boards’ strategic involvement. The relatively sparse prior research on learning in boards has 




2014), or participation in strategic decision-making processes (Westphal and Zajac, 2013), but 
rarely considered that learning may be better understood as an ongoing process of interrelated 
activities (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). In support of this reasoning, our findings indi-
cate that exploratory, transformative, and exploitative learning mediate the relationship be-
tween directors’ knowledge and boards’ strategic involvement. Second, we contribute to the 
absorptive capacity literature (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006; Zahra and George, 2002) by 
focusing on the effects of learning processes at a group level. While firm-level antecedents 
and consequences of absorptive capacity received much attention (Flatten, Greve and Brettel, 
2011), Volberda, Foss and Lyles (2010) emphasize that a deeper understanding of absorptive 
capacity requires reference to upper-echelons such as boards of directors. Because scholars 
tend to treat absorptive capacity as a static construct (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006) and 
thereby miss out on its richness and multidimensionality (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010), 
we adopt a process view of absorptive capacity and develop a model that explains how 
knowledge is gathered, shared, and exploited at a group level (Martinkenaite and Breunig, 
2016). 
 
Governance and Boards in the Norwegian Institutional Setting 
Our theoretical framework and subsequent hypotheses are developed and tested using large-
scale survey data from Norway. Norway is a small country in Northern Europe and can be 
classified as a civil law country with a two-tier corporate governance system. The Norwegian 
Code of Practice for Corporate Governance shares many similarities with codes in other Eu-
ropean countries, including recommendations concerning board structures as well as the divi-
sion of responsibilities among boards, shareholders and management. Specifically, the Nor-
wegian corporate governance system is characterized by a tiered board structure, concentrated 




boards (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011; Sinani et al., 2008). We describe each of these aspects in 
turn. 
Norwegian corporate law differentiates between executive managers (most often the 
CEO) and supervisory boards. CEO duality (i.e., the practice of a single individual serving as 
both CEO and board chair) is prohibited in Norway, yet CEOs typically participate in board 
meetings (Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton, 2007). Norwegian boards have comparatively 
high discretion concerning strategic decision-making and are expected to “lead the company’s 
strategic planning, and make decisions that form the basis for the executive management” 
(Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance). Research accordingly describes 
boards as active in strategic decision-making (Machold et al., 2011) and particularly influen-
tial in shaping firm performance (Lohe and Calabrò, 2017; Zattoni, Gnan and Huse, 2015). 
A second characteristic of Norwegian corporate governance is the prevalence of owner-
ship concentration. Like in most other European countries, ownership in Norway is tradition-
ally under the influence of a controlling shareholder, with families and the state playing the 
most important roles (Mishra, Randoy and Jenssen, 2001). Control is typically enacted 
through director selection as well as pyramid and dual class shareholding (Sinani et al., 2008). 
Boards of directors are elected by the general meeting of shareholders or, where applicable, 
by a corporate assembly. Yet Norway has opened up considerably to foreign and institutional 
investors since the 1990s, with governance principles becoming more accessible to an interna-
tional audience (Rasmussen and Huse, 2011). 
Finally, Norway is known for its strong regulatory regime, particularly regarding board-
level employee and gender representation (Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton, 2007). Depending 
on the size of the firm, Norwegian boards consist of shareholder and employee representa-
tives. In firms with more than 50 employees, one third of board seats can be elected by firm 




tive discussion (Huse, Nielsen and Hagen, 2009). In addition, there has been high institutional 
pressure for equal gender representation since the mid-1990s. Gender diversity adds 
knowledge to boards’ strategic discussions (Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009), supports inno-
vation (Torchia, Calabrò and Huse, 2011) and contributes to firm performance (Post and 
Byron, 2015). 
In sum, the Norwegian corporate governance system presents important similarities and 
differences with other European countries. From prior research we can conclude that Norwe-
gian boards are consistently involved in strategic decision-making (Machold et al., 2011; 
Minichilli et al., 2012) and hence represent an appropriate setting to develop our framework 
and test our hypotheses.  
 
Theoretical Background and Literature Review 
Reviewing the Directors’ Knowledge–Boards’ Strategic Involvement Relationship 
Directors’ knowledge has emerged as a major construct within the board literature 
(Bankewitz, 2017; Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 2014; Minichilli et al., 2012), referring to 
“skills and experiences that individual directors bring to the decision-making process” 
(Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013: 240). There has been an intense debate regarding the 
characteristics of directors’ knowledge and its relationship with boards’ strategic involvement 
(Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013; Pugliese et al., 2009), and two broad conceptualizations 
can be identified: the demographic versus the behavioral approach. According to the demo-
graphic approach, directors bring a set of knowledge attributes to the board that they use to 
contribute to shaping the content, process, and conduct of strategy (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 
2009; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014). This view builds on the implicit as-
sumption that demographic features are valid proxies for directors’ unobservable skills 




Dalton and Cannella, 2003). The behavioral approach extends the demographic stream by 
arguing that the deployment of individual directors’ knowledge requires a stronger reference 
to behavioral and cognitive dimensions (van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). In an early 
attempt to solve the puzzle between the demographic versus behavioral approach, Forbes and 
Milliken (1999) proposed that the concept “use of knowledge and skills” –the board’s ability 
to “to tap the knowledge and skills available to it and then apply them to its tasks”– would 
mediate the relationship between directors’ knowledge and boards’ strategic involvement. 
However, evidence for this proposition is mixed, with studies finding positive (Machold et al., 
2011; Minichilli et al., 2012; Zattoni, Gnan and Huse, 2015), non-linear (van Ees, van der 
Laan and Postma, 2008), and no effects (Zona, 2016).  
Given this ambiguity, a number of scholars have called for a better theoretical account 
of how directors’ knowledge is being explored, transformed and exploited for firms’ strategic 
matters (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013; Pugliese et al., 2009). Learning processes have 
been advanced as a possible explanation in this regard (van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009; 
Westphal and Zajac, 2013) and prior research suggests that directors increase their strategic 
involvement through learning from fellow directors (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001), learning 
from affiliations with other firms (Tuschke, Sanders and Hernandez, 2014), and learning from 
their experience with prior strategic deployments (McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 2008). 
What is hitherto missing is a theoretical framework for learning processes in boards and their 
role in activating directors’ knowledge towards involvement in strategic board tasks.    
 
The Concept of Absorptive Capacity and Theoretical Framework of the Study 
The concept of absorptive capacity offers a theoretical perspective to further elaborate on the 
directors’ knowledge–boards’ strategic involvement relationship by arguing that learning is an 




Zahra and George, 2002). In their seminal work, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) defined absorp-
tive capacity as a firm’s ability to recognize the value of new external information, assimilate 
it, and apply it to commercial ends (p.128). This definition assumes that a firm’s absorptive 
capacity is likely to develop cumulatively, is path dependent, and builds on a stock of existing 
knowledge of a firm’s individuals (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010). 
Several authors have offered reconceptualizations and empirical extensions of the con-
struct, although existing definitions and their conceptual components remain heterogeneous 
and unclear (Zahra and George, 2002). Additionally, many scholars treat the specific learning 
processes that constitute a firm’s absorptive capacity as a “black box”, and only scant atten-
tion is paid to its underlying elements (Todorova and Durisin, 2007). Lane, Koka and Pathak 
(2006) developed a process model of absorptive capacity that specifies three dimensions: (1) 
exploratory learning, which refers to recognizing and understanding firm-external knowledge; 
(2) transformative learning, which is conceptualized as the sharing and transformation of the 
assimilated knowledge, and (3) exploitative learning, which is related to the application of 
acquired knowledge for new knowledge creation. This is consistent with the original concept 
by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) who posit that distinct learning mechanisms, the structure of 
communication between the external environment and the firm, and an active network of rela-
tionships, can influence a firm’s absorptive capacity (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010). 
To enhance their strategic involvement, we argue that boards need to develop and en-
gage in all dimensions of absorptive capacity processes simultaneously (Zahra and George, 
2002). Specifically, the ability to recognize and understand firm-external knowledge (i.e., 
exploratory learning) may enable the board to create an enlarged knowledge base for strategic 
decision-making. Yet this alone will not be sufficient in fostering strategic involvement, un-
less the knowledge base is also transformed and translated into new knowledge creation 




next develop hypotheses concerning the effects of all three learning processes to examine 
their overall effect on boards’ strategic involvement (see Figure 1). 
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Hypotheses Development  
The Direct Effect of Directors’ Knowledge on Boards’ Strategic Involvement 
Consistent with the absorptive capacity literature (Gebauer, Worch and Truffer, 2012), Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) argued that directors’ functional and firm-specific knowledge form the 
pool of available knowledge that the board has at its disposal. Functional knowledge refers to 
expertise in specific business areas (e.g., finance, strategy), and knowledge about the external 
environment (e.g., customers, competitors). Firm-specific knowledge refers to directors’ un-
derstanding of the focal firm’s operations and management issues. Following the absorptive 
capacity logic, the ability to explore, transform and exploit knowledge depends on a board’s 
existing knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) that facilitates defining the locus of 
new knowledge search (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). 
Prior research suggests that directors’ knowledge enables access to and the processing 
of task-related information (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013), fosters directors’ awareness 
of emerging strategic issues (Judge and Dobbins, 1995) and provides a set of abstract prob-
lem-solving heuristics that can be applied to strategic topics (McDonald, Westphal and 
Graebner, 2008). Additionally, firm-specific knowledge contributes to a deep-level under-
standing of inner-firm processes, resulting in the sharing of a common language with firm 
executives (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014). 
Because such a mutual understanding fosters trustworthiness, executives tend to value input 




These arguments are supported by empirical investigations. For example, directors’ 
functional knowledge enables boards to be better equipped to contribute to firm performance 
through higher quality of discussions (Vandenbroucke, Knockaert and Ucbasaran, 2016), and 
reduces information ambiguity in strategic decision-making (Judge et al., 2015). Additionally, 
firm-specific knowledge contributes to tacit knowledge gains about the firm (De Maere, 
Jorissen and Uhlaner, 2014), and leads boards to more accurately interpret information pro-
vided by management (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). In sum, insights from this information 
processing perspective lend support to the proposition that functional and firm-specific 
knowledge are a necessary precondition for boards’ strategic involvement. We therefore hy-
pothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Directors’ knowledge is positively related to boards’ strategic involve-
ment. 
 
The Mediating Effect of Exploratory Learning 
While knowledge is considered an indispensable factor for boards’ strategic involvement, 
simple aggregations of directors’ knowledge fall short of explaining how boards employ di-
rectors’ individual knowledge at a group-level (Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill, 2013). In the 
process view of absorptive capacity, a stock of knowledge alone does not ensure successful 
knowledge application, and firms must establish scanning mechanisms to recognize and un-
derstand their external environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). In this context, exploratory 
learning refers to recognizing and understanding external knowledge (Lane, Koka and Patkak, 
2006) and “directs attention to the intensity, speed, and effort to gather knowledge” 
(Todorova and Durisin, 2007: 777). Khanna, Gulati and Nohria (1998) proposed that a de-
tailed understanding of all relevant problem-solving techniques facilitates knowledge applica-




and competitors (Zahra and George, 2002). Hence, exploratory learning should help to ex-
plain how directors’ knowledge is deployed for strategic involvement.   
There is some evidence to support this theoretical reasoning. First, intensive prepara-
tions of board meetings have been shown to facilitate critical discussions in the board and 
increase independence from top executives (Huse, 2007: 221), which in turn affects the pro-
pensity to be involved in strategic tasks (Minichilli et al., 2012). Moreover, the availability 
and dedication of time to prepare meetings is crucial for effective decision-making (Payne, 
Benson and Finegold, 2009). Second, the speed of knowledge gathering is a key feature for 
boards’ strategic involvement, especially in times of crises (Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). One 
pivotal characteristic in this matter is the timing and timeliness of information provision. In 
the absence of timely information, boards will not have the most accurate or relevant infor-
mation at hand to be involved in strategic decisions. Thus, the timely availability of infor-
mation is likely to allow for a more comprehensive recognition and understanding of external 
knowledge (Zhang, 2010). Third, efforts to gather knowledge are likely to depend on infor-
mation flows within and across boards. Westphal, Seidel and Stewart (2001) suggest that 
board interlocks facilitate information flows from outside the firm and support learning from 
external sources. Moreover, information exchange between CEOs and boards (Zahra and 
Pearce, 1989), and active information search from non-managerial internal and external 
sources benefit strategic decision-making (Pirson and Turnbull, 2011). Active information 
search is further related to information verification, for example through triangulating man-
agement reports and proposals (Zhang, 2010). 
Accordingly, we expect that intensive preparation of board meetings, the speed of in-
formation flows, and information gathering from internal and external sources characterize 
exploratory learning in the board. This process is likely to affect the deployment of directors’ 




Hypothesis 2a: Exploratory learning in the board mediates the positive relationship be-






The Mediating Effect of Transformative Learning 
Transformative learning links exploratory and exploitative learning processes and refers to 
maintaining and developing knowledge over time (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006). Firms must 
be enabled to combine, share and store their pre-existing knowledge as well as adapt it to 
emerging opportunities (Flatten, Greve and Brettel, 2011). This includes an active manage-
ment of knowledge retention to keep the firm “up to date” with the external environment 
(Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006) and reactivate knowledge when needed (Argote, McEvily and 
Reagans, 2003). In turn, scholars suggest that transformative learning enables firms to devel-
op new perceptual schema in dealing with strategic decisions (Zahra and George, 2002) and 
become more capable in changing their cognitive repertoire to absorb new knowledge (Todo-
rova and Durisin, 2007). 
To maintain and develop knowledge over time, communication among directors is piv-
otal as it creates the necessary social conditions for learning to occur (Ellison and Fudenberg, 
1995). Prior research indicates that communication quality and frequency are linked to effec-
tive decision-making in boards (Farquhar, 2011). Communication not only eases mutual un-
derstanding among directors, but also ensures the credibility of all relevant and useful infor-
mation (Massey and Dawes, 2007). Accordingly, the deployment of directors’ knowledge is 
likely to depend on how effective communication supports the maintenance and development 
of knowledge over time. Additionally, transformative learning is likely to depend on the 
quality of interactions during board meetings. Board meetings play a crucial role in 
knowledge transformation (Parker, 2007), because they provide a formal structuring element 
to make use of directors’ existing knowledge. For example, lengthy presentations of known 
information during board meetings lead to a reduction in time for the discussion of critical 
decision-making aspects (Machold and Farquhar, 2013), indicating that knowledge transfor-




detract attention away from openly debating strategy towards routinely reviewing proposals 
(Inglis and Weaver, 2000). A final critical aspect of transformative learning is concerned with 
the combination of directors’ knowledge. Judge et al. (2015) suggest that directors’ 
knowledge breadth and depth enables a more comprehensive assessment of strategic options 
and reduces decision-making information asymmetries. Similarly, balancing knowledge of 
directors and top executives is likely to improve a firm’s ability to deal with new demands 
(Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014), indicating that mutual familiarity with each 
other’s’ knowledge enables directors to maintain and develop their knowledge and translate it 
into higher degrees of strategic involvement.  
In sum, transformative learning is likely to ease the deployment of directors’ knowledge 
and increase boards’ strategic involvement by fostering communication among directors, en-
suring activity in board meetings and combining directors’ knowledge.  
Hypothesis 2b: Transformative learning in the board mediates the positive relationship 
between directors’ knowledge and boards’ strategic involvement. 
 
The Mediating Effect of Exploitative Learning 
Exploitative learning refers to the application of acquired knowledge for new knowledge crea-
tion (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006) and commercial purposes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Recent conceptualizations suggest that knowledge transformation and exploitation are inter-
linked through feedback loops (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010) and form a reinforcing virtu-
ous circle until knowledge becomes exploited (Todorova and Durisin, 2007). Because exploi-
tative learning assists developing new perceptual schema (Jansen, Van den Bosch and Vol-
berda, 2005), a systematic exploitation is likely to enable firms to incorporate explored and 




new systems, processes and competencies that can be used to more effectively match a firm 
with its markets and customers (Zahra and George, 2002).  
There is evidence to indicate that the exploitation of directors’ knowledge affects the 
outcome of strategic decisions (Tuschke, Sanders and Hernandez, 2014). McDonald, 
Westphal and Graebner (2008) for example show that knowledge eases the assessment of 
large quantities of information and identification of solutions to strategic initiatives. Likewise, 
directors’ knowledge can be configured to improve efficiencies in strategic decisions-making 
by reducing and/or broadening R&D spending (Dalziel, Gentry and Bowerman, 2011) or 
choosing between exploration versus exploitation strategies (Heyden et al., 2015). Additional-
ly, it has been shown that knowledge exploitation affects boards’ initialization and evaluation 
of strategic decisions. Zattoni, Gnan and Huse (2015) indicate that the exploitation of direc-
tors’ knowledge strengthens boards’ strategic involvement and results in higher firm perfor-
mance.  
Combining these arguments, we suggest that boards’ strategic involvement increases if 
exploitative learning enables directors to apply their knowledge for strategic decision-making.  
Hypothesis 2c: Exploitative learning in the board mediates the positive relationship be-
tween directors’ knowledge and boards’ strategic involvement. 
 
The Mediating Effect of Complementarities between Learning Processes. So far, we theorized 
that each learning process individually facilitates the deployment of directors’ knowledge for 
boards’ strategic involvement. Yet learning is unlikely to play out in such an atomized and 
unconnected fashion, because processes in boards are intertwined (Huse, 2007) and range on a 
continuum between activity and passivity (Machold and Farquhar, 2013).  
The absorptive capacity perspective suggests that exploratory, transformative and ex-




ing tends to accumulate over time and depends on prior absorptive capacity processes (Cohen 
and Levinthal, 1990). Complementarities refer to firm-inherent ‘fits’ among certain practices, 
whereby the enforcement of one practice increases the marginal return of others (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1995). While all three learning processes have distinct contributions for strategic 
decision-making (Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2005), research conceptualizes learn-
ing as interdependent and mutually supportive (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). For exam-
ple, a firm with strong exploratory learning may develop more effective strategies for high 
levels of exploitative and transformative learning (Zahra and George, 2002). In contrast, a 
firm that fails to deeply engage in knowledge exploration and transformation is unlikely to 
have the necessary ability for an effective exploitation (Katila and Ahuja, 2002).  
Accordingly, boards’ strategic involvement is likely to increase if directors are highly 
engaged in all three learning processes. By spending sufficient time to prepare and seek out 
information (exploratory learning), discussing ideas (transformative learning), and applying it 
to strategic decision-making (exploitative learning), we argue that boards’ strategic involve-
ment is likely to increase. We propose that complementary effects are more likely than substi-
tutional effects whereby one learning process may adjust for weaknesses in another one 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Boards may well engage in extensive preparation of board 
meetings and discussions about strategic options, but if they lack the ability to apply and ex-
ploit the output of these learning processes, their involvement in strategy is less likely to be of 
importance.  
Thus, the three dimensions of absorptive capacity are likely to complement each other, 
and boards’ strategic involvement thus benefits from complementarities between exploratory, 




Hypothesis 3: Complementarities between exploratory learning, transformative learn-
ing, and exploitative learning mediate the positive relationship between directors’ knowledge 








To test our hypotheses we follow a theory-driven deductive research design and use data col-
lected through the first version of the Value Creating Board survey instrument (Huse, 2009). 
This is an openly available, comprehensive instrument that has been used in several countries 
such as Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands (Minichilli et al., 2012; Voordeckers et al., 2014). 
For our purpose we decided to use data from Norway with responses from CEOs in the 2003 
“innovation” survey (Huse, 2009). Our motivation to use this survey stems from the coverage 
of a broad variety of firms (35% listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 33% publicly-owned, and 
25% foreign-owned) and the strong reliance on constructs used or suggested in prior research. 
The CEOs had been contacted via mail and sent two postal reminders as well as one follow-
up telephone call to increase the sample size and response rate. Of the initial sample of 1730 
CEOs, a total of 28 percent or 488 CEOs responded. Following prior research (Machold et al., 
2011; Minichilli et al., 2012), we consider CEOs as the most informed actor to evaluate 
boards and provide a valid judgment about boards’ strategic involvement (Zattoni, Gnan and 
Huse, 2015), especially in our context of Norwegian boards (Grosvold, Brammer and Rayton, 
2007). To test for a self-attribution bias, we correlated the CEO’s perception of boards’ stra-
tegic involvement with two potential proxies of CEO power (Pugliese, Minichilli and Zattoni, 
2014). We found a small correlation between boards’ strategic involvement and CEO tenure 
(r=.132; p<.05), and no correlation between boards’ strategic involvement and CEO age (r=-
.060; p>.05). This implies that self-attribution bias does not systematically bias our results.  
Several procedures were utilized to minimize a common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). First, all survey items had been recommended and used in previous studies, and scales 
had been pre-tested through pilot studies and preliminary expert interviews to reduce item 




ality to reduce social desirability bias. Third, all variables had been kept separate from each 
other in the survey to avoid spill-over effects. Finally, the introductory letter stated that no 
‘right or wrong’ answers existed and encouraged the respondents to be as candid as possible. 
We used Harman’s one factor test to test for common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
Exploratory factor analysis of all constructs exhibited more than one factor with eigenvalues 
higher than 1.0, suggesting that most variance accounts for more than one general factor. The 
partial correlation procedure that controls for the effects of method variance did not reveal 
any indication for the existence of common method bias (Lindell and Whitney, 2001).   
 
Variables and Measures 
Boards’ Strategic Involvement. Boards’ strategic involvement is a latent and multi-dimen-
sional construct (Pugliese et al., 2009). We utilize a six item measure that has been used in 
other studies (Zattoni, Gnan and Huse, 2015) and confirmed in recent field work (Machold 
and Farquhar, 2013). Specifically, the CEO was asked to which degree the board provides 
advice on (1) general management issues (2) financial issues, (3) technical issues, (4) market 
issues, and to which degree the board (5) actively initiates strategy proposals and (6) makes 
decisions on long-term strategy. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.85.  
 
Directors’ Knowledge. We distinguish between “firm-specific knowledge” and “functional 
knowledge” to measure directors’ knowledge (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). In line with other 
studies (Machold et al., 2011; Minichilli and Hansen, 2007), directors’ knowledge was meas-
ured by asking the CEO to which extent board members have (1) knowledge of firms’ main 
operations, (2) knowledge of firms’ critical technology and key competence, (3) knowledge of 
firms’ weak sides concerning products and services, (4) knowledge of the developments of 




knowledge of developments concerning firm’s markets and customer’s needs. Cronbach’s 
alpha is 0.83. 
 
Mediating Variables. Due to the exploratory approach in applying the absorptive capacity 
concept in a group context, pre-validated scales were not available. We derived measures 
from the absorptive capacity literature (Cadiz, Sawyer and Griffith, 2009; Camisón and Forés, 
2010; Flatten et al., 2011; Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2005; Szulanski, Cappetta 
and Jensen, 2004) and aligned these measures as closely as possible to the constructs of our 
study (Lane, Koka and Pathak, 2006). All measures show acceptable levels of construct relia-
bility (see Table 3 in the results section). 
We use a seven-item measure to assess exploratory learning. The first item covers how 
fast information circulates to exchange and develop new and unknown knowledge (Flatten et 
al., 2011). The second and third items assess whether directors are active in seeking and col-
lecting information (Cadiz, Sawyer and Griffith, 2009). The fourth and fifth items cover the 
information flow from inside the firm and its employees (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010), 
and the last two items measure exploratory learning from firm-external sources (Flatten et al., 
2011; Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2005). To measure exploratory learning, the 
CEO was asked to which extent the board members (1) have a fast information flow between 
themselves, (2) explore information before meetings, (3) actively seek information in addition 
to management reports, (4) are familiar with employees’ view on health, security and envi-
ronment, (5) are familiar with employees’ view on management-union collaborations, (6) are 
building networks, and (7) are lobbying and legitimating. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.71. 
The construct transformative learning covers the availability and utilization of 
knowledge (Flatten et al., 2011; Jansen, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2005) and directors’ 




Szulanski, Cappetta and Jensen, 2004). The CEO was asked if board members (1) are familiar 
with each other’s competence, (2) have a good match of work and knowledge and skills, (3) 
fully use their knowledge and skill, (4) give sufficient priority to the board tasks, (5) are 
available if needed, and (6) are all active during their meetings. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.85.   
Exploitative learning is measured using items related to the application of knowledge 
for innovative actions, without delving into innovation itself (Cadiz, Sawyer and Griffith, 
2009; Camisón and Forés, 2010). Exploitative learning was assessed by asking the CEO if the 
firm is considered as (1) being the first firm to introduce new products to the market, (2) be-
ing the first firm to develop and introduce new technologies, (3) being the first firm to devel-
op innovative management systems, (4) changing the organizational structure to promote in-
novation, and (5) entering new foreign markets. Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73. 
 
Control Variables. We included several control variables to account for other explanations of 
boards’ strategic involvement and our Norwegian context. At the firm level, we first control 
for industry characteristics using a dummy variable with the value of “1” if the firm operates 
within a high-tech sector (Carpenter, Pollock and Leary, 2003). Second, we control for firm 
size measured as the logarithmic transformation of firm sales in million Norwegian kroner 
(Machold et al., 2011). At the board-level, we control for board size (measured by the total 
number of directors serving on the board), the insider-outsider ratio (calculated as the per-
centage of executive directors on the board), directors’ ownership and chairperson’s owner-
ship (Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014). Ownership is measured as the ratio of 
directors’ (chairperson’s) shareholding to total shareholding (Zahra, Neubaum and Huse, 
2000). With respect to CEO characteristics, we control for CEO ownership (Zahra, Neubaum 
and Huse, 2000), measured by the ratio of CEO’s shareholding to total shareholding. We fur-




(1 for presence, 0 for absence) (Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 2014). Finally, due to the Norwe-
gian setting, we control for the number of employee-elected directors (Zattoni, Gnan and 
Huse, 2015). 
 
Analyses and Results 
Estimation Methods and Descriptive Statistics 
We applied structural equation modelling (SEM) to test our hypotheses, because it allows 
simultaneous estimation of multiple relationships between latent constructs. We switch to the 
Baron-Kenny mediation procedure to test for complementarities among the learning processes 
(Baron and Kenny, 1986), because SEM tends to produce confounding results for multilateral 
effects (Whittington et al., 1999). Table 1 shows means, maximum and minimum values, and 
standard deviations, while Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients for all variables. As 
expected, directors’ knowledge and the learning processes are positively related to boards’ 
strategic involvement. We checked for multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation fac-
tors (VIF). The highest VIF (=1.7) appeared when we test for the meditation of all learning 
processes and was within an acceptable range.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Structural Equation Modelling Results 
For the SEM analyses, we followed the well-established two-stage procedure (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the measurement mod-
el validity and construct discriminant validity. The measurement model results indicate an 
acceptable model fit (Chi
2




struct discriminant validity using the composite reliability scores of the multi-item constructs 
(see table 3). Factor loadings ranged between .37 and .82 (p<.01) and the reliability scores did 
not fall below 0.71, indicating acceptable reliability.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
We used a structural model to test our hypothesized model (Chi
2
[54]=5.799; CFI=.846; 
RMSEA=.099). To balance SEM parsimony and fit, we ran our analysis excluding the control 
variables. Our results yet also hold for a variety of other specifications (removing only uncor-
related control variables, z-standardization of variables, logarithmic transformation of varia-
bles). Figure 2 presents the results with path coefficients. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that directors’ knowledge positively relates to boards’ strategic 
involvement. The path coefficient (.429; p<.001) supports this prediction. Hypothesis 2a sug-
gests that exploratory learning strengthens the relationship between directors’ knowledge and 
boards’ strategic involvement. The path coefficients support this suggestion. Directors’ 
knowledge serves as a positive predictor of exploratory learning (.563; p<.001), and explora-
tory learning is positively related to boards’ strategic involvement (.264; p<.001). Hypothesis 
2b suggests that transformative learning strengthens the relationship between directors’ 
knowledge and boards’ strategic involvement. The path coefficients lend support for this pre-
diction (directors’ knowledge –> transformative learning: .573; p<.001; transformative learn-
ing –> boards’ strategic involvement: .276; p<.001). Hypothesis 2c predicts that exploitative 
learning strengthens the relationship between directors’ knowledge and boards’ strategic in-




p<.001), the path coefficient between exploitative learning and boards’ strategic involvement 




We also test for mediation effects using the Baron-Kenny procedure. Baron and Kenny (1986) 
suggested that mediation effects are supported if four conditions are met: (1) the independent 
variable (i.e., directors’ knowledge and skills) is significantly related to the mediators (i.e., 
exploratory learning, transformative learning, exploitative learning) (model 1-3, table 4); (2) 
the independent variable is significantly related to the dependent variable (i.e., boards’ strate-
gic involvement) (model 4, table 4); and, when studied simultaneously, (3) the mediators are 
significantly related to the dependent variable (model 5-7, table 4); while (4) the independent 
variable has at least a weakened relationship to the dependent variable when entering the me-
diators (model 8, table 4). The following equation summarizes the fourth condition of the 
Baron-Kenny procedure: 
yi = β1 x1 + β2 m1 + β3 m2 + β4 m3 + ϖit + eit, 
where index i stands for the respective board, βi represent the regression coefficients, x1 rep-
resents the independent variable “directors’ knowledge”, m1 represents the mediator “explora-
tive learning”, m2 represents the mediator “transformative learning”, m3 represent the media-
tor “exploitative learning”, ϖit is a vector of the control variables, and eit includes the error 
term. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that complementarities between exploratory, transformative and 
exploitative learning strengthens the relationship between directors’ knowledge and boards’ 
strategic involvement. Model 8 in Table 4 supports this suggestion. When entering all learn-




boards’ strategic involvement is weakened. Including all three mediators simultaneously also 
adds considerably to the model fit (adjusted R
2
=.454, p<.001; F-value=26.70, p<.001) and 
lends support for a partial mediation effect of complementary learning processes. 
----------------------------------- 




We used a variety of alternative specifications to ensure the robustness of our analyses. First, 
we applied the Sobel test to confirm the existence of mediation effects (Sobel, 1982). The 
Sobel test assesses whether the estimate linking the independent variable to the dependent 
variable drops significantly when entering the mediators. The results in Table 5 support the 
conclusions from the Baron-Kenny procedure. We find a significant relationship for explora-
tory and transformative learning (p<.001), but a weaker one for exploitative learning 
(p=.004).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Using an alternative operationalization for our dependent variable (Pugliese, Minichilli and 
Zattoni, 2014), the Baron-Kenny mediation analysis produced comparable results to our orig-
inal conceptualization (Model 1 in Table 6). When entering all learning processes as media-
tors into the model, directors’ knowledge remains a positive but weak predictor of boards’ 
strategic involvement (.146; p<.05), and all three learning processes significantly contribute to 
explain the dependent variable (exploratory learning: .324, p<.001; transformative learning: 




initial findings when using a split-sample design that excluded listed firms (Model 2 in Table 
6). 
----------------------------------- 




Our findings provide new insights concerning directors’ knowledge and the mechanisms by 
which such knowledge is activated towards involvement in strategic tasks. Prior research on 
directors’ knowledge has drawn on a variety of perspectives such as information processing 
theory (Khanna, Jones and Boivie, 2014), resource dependence theory (Dalziel, Gentry and 
Bowerman, 2011), or human capital theory (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009) to predict boards’ 
strategic involvement. These studies, however, mostly lack a micro-level explanation of how 
individual directors’ knowledge translates into boards’ strategic involvement (Johnson, 
Schnatterly and Hill, 2013), and we sought to address this theoretical gap by advancing an 
absorptive capacity perspective. Absorptive capacity and its focus on learning processes is 
particularly relevant since it allows assessing the concurrent implications of exploratory, 
transformative and exploitative learning in a strategic decision-making context (Lane, Koka 
and Pathak, 2006). Our findings indicate that boards’ strategic involvement indeed hinges on 
how directors explore and transform their firm-specific and functional knowledge. We find 
evidence that the intensity, speed and efforts to gather knowledge from inside and outside the 
board (exploratory learning) and the quality of cognitive interactions during and beyond board 
meetings (transformative learning) greatly matter for boards’ involvement in strategic matters 
of the firm. Thus, it appears that directors’ knowledge needs to be processed to make a mean-




However, we find only partial support for the prediction that the application of the ac-
quired knowledge (exploitative learning) has a positive impact on boards’ strategic involve-
ment. This may be because boards of directors are rarely involved in exploiting strategic deci-
sions, and our finding may be evidence of important boundary conditions. In line with the 
literature (Machold and Farquhar, 2013; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), boards of directors –
while an important arena to advice firms’ executives on strategic matters– may lack the au-
thority to pursue their strategic interests in the relationship with top managers (Dalziel, Gentry 
and Bowerman, 2011). It thus appears important that future research not only points to 
knowledge complementarities between boards of directors and top management teams 
(Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014), but also addresses how these groups ex-
plore, transform, and exploit their combined knowledge in firms’ strategic matters.   
Our findings also contribute to the literature on learning processes in boards. While pri-
or theorizing (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) and recent evidence (Machold et al., 2011; Zattoni, 
Gnan and Huse, 2015) have greatly advanced our understanding of whether and how boards 
can contribute to firms’ strategic matters, a recent review of the literature argued that dynamic 
perspectives may be particularly suited to address the hitherto under-researched link between 
board processes and directors’ cognitive capacities (Pugliese et al., 2009). Subsequent theoriz-
ing emphasized that strategic decisions benefit from directors’ learning in contexts other than 
the focal firm (Heyden et al., 2015; McDonald, Westphal and Graebner, 2008; Tuschke, 
Sanders and Hernandez, 2014). Our findings extend this perspective by highlighting that 
learning processes are intertwined and have a mutually reinforcing effect on boards’ strategic 
involvement. Scholars could further investigate the conditions for complementarities between 
learning processes in the board in order to better understand when the combination of all 




Finally, we also make a contribution to the absorptive capacity literature. The majority 
of research focuses on intra-firm and inter-firm antecedents of absorptive capacity (Flatten, 
Greve and Brettel, 2011), but rarely considers the process of how potential absorptive capaci-
ty (i.e. directors’ knowledge) becomes used in a firm governance context. Following a recent 
call in the literature (Volberda, Foss and Lyles, 2010), we put forward a more actor-centric 
interpretation of the absorptive capacity concept and focus on its implications at a group-
level, i.e. boards of directors. Our findings indicate that the concurrent processes of explorato-
ry learning, transformative learning, and exploitative learning in the board help to explain 
why boards of directors become more (or less) involved in strategic decision-making. Thus, 
we add an important theoretical layer to the absorptive capacity discussion, highlighting the 
concept’s richness and multidimensionality to explore how potential translates into realized 
absorptive capacity. 
 
Contributions to Board Practice 
Our theoretical perspective and findings are also highly relevant for practitioners. In particu-
lar, the distinction between three different, but inter-related learning processes could serve as 
a guideline for boards of directors that seek to improve their involvement in strategic matters. 
As boards are increasingly seeking to strengthen their involvement in strategy, they should 
place great emphasis on recognizing and understanding external knowledge (exploratory 
learning) and maintaining and developing knowledge over time (transformative learning), but 
remain more cautious in directly applying their acquired knowledge (exploitative learning). 
Taking account of these different effects from learning processes, boards may be better suited 
to adapt to different strategic decision-making situations. 
Our findings further suggest that boards cannot simply assume that selecting knowl-




beneficial when individual knowledge is translated through learning processes to fellow direc-
tors. As such, our results highlight the importance of periodic board evaluations to assess 
whether individual directors are willing to share, obtain, and apply their knowledge. Such 
evaluations may not only help boards in assessing their current strengths and weaknesses, but 
also facilitate adaptions to opportunities or threats. 





Opportunities for Future Research 
Several opportunities arise for future research from our study. First, research may benefit 
from testing the implications of our group-level perspective for firm-level outcomes such as 
innovation (Ebersberger and Herstad, 2011). The literature offers several methodologies in 
this regard (Flatten et al., 2011), in particular by combining survey and archival data. Scholars 
may thereby also continue to assess the validity of our group-level measures of boards’ ab-
sorptive capacity.  
Second, we focused on directors’ functional and firm-specific knowledge as antecedents 
for learning processes (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Minichilli et al., 2012). While this is con-
sistent with prior absorptive capacity research (Gebauer, Worch and Truffer, 2012), Volberda, 
Foss and Lyles (2010) argued that little is known how firms are able to store and retrieve 
knowledge “stocks”. As boards are subject to constant change, storing and transmitting direc-
tors’ knowledge over time becomes particularly important. Thus, we encourage scholars to 
apply a long-term perspective to study learning processes in boards. 
Third, our finding that exploitative learning only partially mediates the directors’ 
knowledge-boards’ strategic involvement relationship deserves further attention. We suggest 
that scholars could account for learning complementarities between boards and top execu-
tives. As several studies indicate (Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor, 2014; Westphal, 
1999), strategic decisions are typically reflective of inputs from boards and top executives, 
and research could investigate processual dynamics as well as boundary conditions between 
the board and the top management team (Walther, Morner and Calabrò, 2017). As our Nor-
wegian context exhibits both similarities and differences in comparison to other countries 
(Machold et al., 2011), this could include testing our framework in different governance set-









Summary of Findings and Contributions 
By introducing the concept of absorptive capacity into research on boards, we develop a con-
ceptual model that addresses how learning processes in the board facilitate the deployment of 
directors’ knowledge for strategic decision-making. Our findings indicate that exploratory and 
transformative learning help to explain how director’s knowledge leads to higher levels of 
strategic involvement, while we only find partial support for this relationship in the case of 
exploitative learning. Our study further suggests that these three learning processes mutually 
reinforce each other and have complementary effects. We contribute to an improved theoreti-
cal understanding of how directors’ knowledge translates into boards’ strategic involvement 
by emphasizing the value of learning processes and provide a deeper understanding of how 




Tables and Figures 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Construct N Min Max Mean SD 
Boards’ strate-
gic involvement 
478 1.00 5.00 3.37 0.70 
Directors’ 
knowledge 
484 1.67 5.00 3.83 0.60 
Exploratory 
learning 
484 1.00 5.00 3.22 0.67 
Transformative 
learning 
480 1.29 5.00 3.92 0.69 
Exploitative 
learning 
422 1.00 5.00 2.87 0.90 
High-tech firm 481 0 1 0.29 0.45 
Firm size (ln) 478 0 10.65 4.10 1.79 
Board size  482 1 12 5.20 2.10 
Insider-outsider 
ratio 
476 0 1 0.31 0.27 
Directors’  
ownership 
482 0 100 17.42 26.31 
Chairpersons’ 
ownership 
482 0 100 16.81 29.22 
CEO ownership 482 0 100 27.54 36.96 
CEO duality 484 0 1 0.09 0.28 
Employee  
directors 





Table 2 Correlation Matrix 
# Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Boards’ strategic involvement  1              
2 Directors’ knowledge .49** 1             
3 Exploratory learning .53** .44** 1            
4 Transformative learning .53** .52** .56** 1           
5 Exploitative learning .27** .19** .26** .18** 1          
6 High-tech firm -.01 .05 .09 .06 .14** 1         
7 Firm size (ln) -.03 -.12** .02 -.01 .28** .15** 1        
8 Board size  -.20** -.24** -.08 -.16** .11* .09* .52** 1       
9 Insider-outsider ratio .05 .17** .10* .04 -.06 -.00 .04 -.12** 1      
10 Directors’ ownership .00 -.02 .02 -.04 -.01 -.09 -.15** -.13** -.06 1     
11 Chairpersons’ ownership .14** .17** .09** .12* -.03 -.08 -.15** -.35** .12* -.09 1    
12 CEO ownership .20** .33** .06 .16** -.02 -.03 -.22** -.44** .32** -.03 .03 1   
13 CEO duality .12** .19** .07 .07 -.09 -.08 -.20** -.28** .15** .08 .22** .29** 1  
14 Employee directors -.02** -.14** .00 -.11** .09 .14** .53** .66** .24** -.21** -.23** -.30** -.18** 1 















The extent to which the board:  0.851 
 provides advice on general management issues 0.636  
 provides advice on financial issues 0.628  
 provides advice on technical issues 0.499  
 provides advice on market issues 0.679  
 actively initiates strategy proposals 0.420  




The extent to which board members have knowledge of:   0.834 
 firm’s main operations 0.704  
 firm’s critical technology and key competence  0.787  
 firm’s weak sides concerning products and services  0.701  
 the development of the firm’s technology 0.722  
 firm’s health, safety, and environment 0.557  





The extent to which board members:  0.714 
 have a fast information flow between themselves 0.582  
 explore information before meetings 0.475  
 actively seek information in addition to management reports 0.442  
 are familiar with employees’ view on health, safety, and envi-
ronment 
0.737  
 are familiar with employees’ view on management-union col-
laborations 
0.501  
 are building networks 0.369  




The extent to which board members:   0.845 
 are familiar with each other’s competence 0.797  
 have a good match of work, knowledge and skills  0.816  
 fully use their knowledge and skill 0.662  
 give sufficient priority to the board tasks 0.691  
 are available if needed 0.574  




The extent to which the firm can be considered as:  0.729 
 being the first firm to introduce new products to the market 0.631  
 being the first firm to develop and introduce new technologies 0.659  
 being the first firm to develop innovative management systems 0.583  
 changing the organizational structure to promote innovation 0.615  




































Directors’ knowledge 0.473*** 0.534*** 0.234*** 0.472*** 0.287*** 0.269*** 0.453*** 0.203*** 
Exploratory learning     0.391***   0.265*** 
Transformative learning      0.376***  0.268*** 
Exploitative learning       0.175*** 0.106** 
High-tech firm 0.059 0.012 0.081 - 0.033 - 0.054 - 0.039 - 0.053 - 0.062 
Firm size (ln) 0.080 0.130** 0.308*** 0.164** 0.131** 0.119* 0.095 0.049 
Board size - 0.061 - 0.078 - 0.001 - 0.050 - 0.026 - 0.016 - 0.044 0.001 
Insider-outsider ratio 0.027 - 0.074 - 0.066 - 0.056 - 0.069 - 0.032 - 0.054 - 0.049 
Directors’ ownership 0.044 - 0.041 0.034 0.024 0.006 0.040 0.004 0.016 
Chairpersons’ ownership 0.033 0.041 - 0.005 0.040 0.025 0.036 0.024 0.030 
CEO ownership - 0.090 0.023 0.006 0.080 0.117* 0.076 0.076 0.101* 
CEO duality 0.011 - 0.018 - 0.072 - 0.014 - 0.016 - 0.003 0.016 0.016 
Employee directors 0.035 - 0.044 - 0.034 - 0.123
†
 - 0.133* - 0.105 - 0.094 - 0.091 
R
2
 0.231 0.315 0.148 0.285 0.403 0.384 0.327 0.472 
Adjusted R
2
 0.214 0.299 0.126 0.269 0.389 0.369 0.308 0.454 
F-value 13.53*** 20.51*** 6.81*** 17.82*** 27.35*** 25.13*** 17.28*** 26.70*** 
Note:  Significance levels: 
†







































Note:  Significance levels: 
†









Boards’ strategic  
involvement  
Model 2 
Boards’ strategic  
involvement 
Directors’ knowledge 0.146** 0.215*** 
Exploratory learning 0.324*** 0.265*** 
Transformative learning 0.263*** 0.279*** 
Exploitative learning 0.144*** 0.097* 
High-tech firm           -0.036 -0.080* 
Firm size (ln)       - 0.012           0.032  
Board size         0.019          -0.019 
Insider-outsider ratio        -0.008          -0.049 
Directors’ ownership        -0.063           0.019 
Chairpersons’ ownership        -0.026           0.018 
CEO ownership            0.001*             0.096* 
CEO duality          0.046           0.017 
Employee directors         -0.024          -0.080 
R
2
           0.465           0.491 
Adjusted R
2
           0.447           0.471 
F-value 25.98*** 25.57*** 
Note:  Significance levels: 
†
<.0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 Model 1 conceptualizes the dependent variable following the operationalization by Pugliese, Minichil-
















Note:  H3 was tested using multiple linear regression analysis (see Table 4).  







Anderson, J. C. and D. W. Gerbing, 1988, "Structural equation modeling in practice: A 
review and recommended two-step approach". Psychological Bulletin, 103: 411-423. 
Argote. L., B. McEvily and R. Reagans, 2003, "Managing knowledge in organizations: An 
integrative framework and review of emerging themes". Organization Science, 49: 571-
582. 
Argote, L. and E. Miron-Spektor, 2011, "Organizational learning: From experience to 
knowledge". Organization Science, 22: 1123-1137. 
Bankewitz, M., 2017, "Board advisory tasks: The importance to differentiate between 
functional and firm-specific advice". European Management Review, online first, doi: 
10.1111/emre.12139. 
Baron, R. M. and D. A. Kenny, 1986, "The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social 
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations". Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 51: 1173. 
Cadiz, D., J. E. Sawyer and T. L. Griffith, 2009, "Developing and validating field 
measurement scales for absorptive capacity and experienced community of practice". 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 69: 1035-1058. 
Camisón, C. and B. Forés, 2010, "Knowledge absorptive capacity: New insights for its 
conceptualization and measurement". Journal of Business Research, 63: 707-715. 
Carpenter, M. A., T. G. Pollock and M. M. Leary, 2003, "Testing a model of reasoned risk‐
taking: Governance, the experience of principals and agents, and global strategy in high‐
technology IPO firms". Strategic Management Journal, 24: 803-820. 
Carpenter, M. A. and J. D. Westphal, 2001, "The strategic context of external network ties: 
Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision 
making". Academy of Management Journal, 44: 639-660. 
Cohen, W. M. and D. A. Levinthal, 1990, "Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on 
learning and innovation". Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-152. 
Daily, C. M., D. R. Dalton and A. A. Cannella, 2003, "Corporate governance: Decades of 
dialogue and data". Academy of Management Review, 28: 371-382. 
Dalziel, T., R. J. Gentry and M. Bowerman, 2011, "An integrated agency–resource 
dependence view of the influence of directors' human and relational capital on firms' R&D 
spending". Journal of Management Studies, 48: 1217-1242. 
De Maere, J., A. Jorissen and L. M. Uhlaner, 2014, "Board capital and the downward spiral: 
Antecedents of bankruptcy in a sample of unlisted firms". Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 22: 387-407. 
Ebersberger, B. and S. J. Herstad, 2011, "Product innovation and the complementarities of 




Ellison, G. and D. Fudenberg, 1995, "Word-of-mouth communication and social learning". 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110: 93-125. 
Farquhar, S. 2011, "The impact of board processes on board role performance and 
effectiveness: An empirical study of UK listed companies". PhD Thesis: University of 
Wolverhampton. 
Flatten, T. C., A. Engelen, S. A. Zahra and M. Brettel, 2011, "A measure of absorptive 
capacity: Scale development and validation". European Management Journal, 29: 98-116. 
Flatten, T. C., G. I. Greve and M. Brettel, 2011, "Absorptive capacity and firm performance in 
SMEs: The mediating influence of strategic alliances". European Management Review, 8: 
137-152. 
Forbes, D. P. and F. J. Milliken, 1999, "Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding 
boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups". Academy of Management Review, 
24: 489-505. 
Gebauer, H., H. Worch and B. Truffer, 2012, "Absorptive capacity, learning processes and 
combinative capabilities as determinants of strategic innovation". European Management 
Journal, 30: 57-73. 
Grosvold, J., S. Brammer and B. Rayton, 2007, “Board diversity in the United Kingdom and 
Norway: an exploratory analysis”. Business Ethics: A European Review, 16: 344-357. 
Hambrick, D. C. and P. A. Mason, 1984, "Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of 
its top managers". Academy of Management Review, 9: 193-206. 
Heyden, M. L. M., J. Oehmichen, S. Nichting and H. W. Volberda, 2015, "Board background 
heterogeneity and exploration‐exploitation: The role of the institutionally adopted board 
model". Global Strategy Journal, 5: 154-176. 
Huse, M., 2007, Boards, Governance and Value Creation: The Human Side of Corporate 
Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Huse, M., 2009, "The ‘value creating board’ surveys: A benchmark" in M. Huse, 2009, The 
value creating board: Corporate governance and organizational behaviour, London, UK: 
Routledge, pp. 367-383. 
Huse, M., S. T. Nielsen and I. M. Hagen, 2009, "Women and employee-elected board 
members, and their contributions to board control tasks". Journal of Business Ethics, 89: 
581-597. 
Inglis, S. and L. Weaver, 2000, "Designing agendas to reflect board roles and responsibilities: 
Results of a study". Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 11: 65-77. 
Jansen, J. J. P., F. A. J. Van Den Bosch and H. W. Volberda, 2005, "Managing potential and 
realized absorptive capacity: How do organizational antecedents matter?". Academy of 
Management Journal, 48: 999-1015. 
Johnson, S. G., K. Schnatterly and A. D. Hill, 2013, "Board composition beyond 





Judge, W. Q. and G. H. Dobbins, 1995, "Antecedents and effects of outside director's 
awareness of CEO decision style". Journal of Management, 21: 43-64. 
Judge, W. Q., M. A. Witt, A. Zattoni, T. Talaulicar, J. J. Chen, K. Lewellyn, H. W. Hu, D. 
Shukla, J. Gabrielsson and F. Lopez, 2015, "Corporate governance and IPO underpricing 
in a cross‐national sample: A multilevel knowledge‐based view". Strategic Management 
Journal, 36: 1174-1185. 
Katila, R. and G. Ahuja, 2002, "Something old, something new: A longitudional study of 
search behavior and new product introduction". Academy of Management Journal, 45: 
1183-1194. 
Khanna, T., R. Gulati and N. Nohria, 1998, "The dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, 
cooperation, and relative scope". Strategic Management Journal, 19: 193-210. 
Khanna, P., C. D. Jones and S. Boivie, 2014, "Director human capital, information processing 
demands, and board effectiveness". Journal of Management, 40: 557-585. 
Kor, Y. Y. and C. Sundaramurthy, 2009, "Experience-based human capital and social capital 
of outside directors". Journal of Management, 35: 981-1006. 
Lane, P. J., B. R. Koka and S. Pathak, 2006, "The reification of absorptive capacity: A critical 
review and rejuvenation of the construct". Academy of Management Review, 31: 833-863. 
Lane, P. and M. Lubatkin, 1998, "Relative absorptive capacity and interorganizational 
learning". Strategic Management Journal 19: 461-477. 
Lindell, M. K. and D. J. Whitney, 2001, "Accounting for common method variance in cross-
sectional research designs". Journal of Applied Psychology, 86: 114-121. 
Lohe, F.-W. and A. Calabrò, 2017, "Please do not disturb! Differentiating board tasks in 
family and non-family firms during financial distress". Scandinavian Journal of 
Management, 33: 36-49. 
Machold, S. and S. Farquhar, 2013, "Board task evolution: A longitudinal field study in the 
UK". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 21: 147-164. 
Machold, S., M. Huse, A. Minichilli and M. Nordqvist, 2011, "Board leadership and strategy 
involvement in small firms: A team production approach". Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 19: 368-383. 
Martinkenaite, I. and K. J. Breunig, 2016, "The emergence of absorptive capacity through 
micro–macro level interactions". Journal of Business Research, 69: 700-708. 
Massey, G. R. and P. L. Dawes, 2007, "The antecedents and consequence of functional and 
dysfunctional conflict between marketing managers and sales managers". Industrial 
Marketing Management, 36: 1118-1129. 
McDonald, M. L., J. D. Westphal and M. E. Graebner, 2008, "What do they know? The 
effects of outside director acquisition experience on firm acquisition performance". 




McNulty, T. and A. Pettigrew, 1999, "Strategists on the board". Organization Studies, 20: 47-
74. 
Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1995, "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and 
organizational change in manufacturing". Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19: 179-
208. 
Minichilli, A. and C. Hansen, 2007, "The board advisory tasks in small firms and the event of 
crises". Journal of Management & Governance, 11: 5-22. 
Minichilli, A., A. Zattoni, S. Nielsen and M. Huse, 2012, "Board task performance: An 
exploration of micro‐and macro‐level determinants of board effectiveness". Journal of 
Organizational Behavior, 33: 193-215. 
Mishra, C.S., T. Randoy and J.I. Jenssen, 2001, "The effect of founding family influence on 
firm value and corporate governance". Journal of International Financial Management 
and Accounting, 12(3): 235-259. 
Nielsen, S. and M. Huse, 2010, "Women directors' contribution to board decision‐making and 
strategic involvement: The role of equality perception". European Management Review, 7: 
16-29. 
Parker, L. D., 2007, "Internal governance in the nonprofit boardroom: A participant observer 
study". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15: 923-934. 
Payne, G. T., G. S. Benson and D. L. Finegold, 2009, "Corporate board attributes, team 
effectiveness and financial performance". Journal of Management Studies, 46: 704-731. 
Pirson, M. and S. Turnbull, 2011, "Corporate governance, risk management, and the financial 
crisis: An information processing view". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
19: 459-470. 
Podsakoff, P. M., S. B. MacKenzie, J.-Y. Lee and N. P. Podsakoff, 2003, "Common method 
biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended 
remedies". Journal of Applied Psychology, 88: 879-903. 
Post, C. and K. Byron, 2015, "Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-
analysis". Academy of Management Journal, 58: 1546-1571. 
Pugliese, A., P. J. Bezemer, A. Zattoni, M. Huse, F. A. J. Van den Bosch and H. W. Volberda, 
2009, "Boards of directors' contribution to strategy: A literature review and research 
agenda". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 292-306. 
Pugliese, A., A. Minichilli and A. Zattoni, 2014, "Integrating agency and resource 
dependence theory: Firm profitability, industry regulation, and board tasks performance". 
Journal of Business Research, 67: 1189-1200. 
Rasmussen, J. L. and M. Huse, 2011, "Corporate governance in Norway: Women and 
employee-elected board members" in C. A. Mallin, 2011, Handbook on International 
Corporate Governance: Country Analyses, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 121-148. 
Rindova, V. P., 1999, "What corporate boards have to do with strategy: A cognitive 




Rosenkopf, L. and A. Nerkar, 2001, "Beyond local search: Boundary-spanning, exploration, 
and impact in the optical disk industry", Strategic Management Journal, 22: 287-306.  
Sinani, E., A. Stafsudd, S. Thomsen, C. Edling and T. Randøy, 2008, "Corporate governance 
in Scandinavia: Comparing networks and formal institutions". European Management 
Review, 5: 27-40. 
Sobel, M. E., 1982, "Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural 
equation models". Sociological Methodology, 13: 290-312. 
Sundaramurthy, C., K. Pukthuanthong and Y. Kor, 2014, "Positive and negative synergies 
between the CEO's and the corporate board's human and social capital: A study of 
biotechnology firms". Strategic Management Journal, 35: 845-868. 
Szulanski, G., R. Cappetta and R. J. Jensen, 2004, "When and how trustworthiness matters: 
Knowledge transfer and the moderating effect of causal ambiguity". Organization Science, 
15: 600-613. 
Terjesen, S., R. Sealy and V. Singh, 2009, "Women directors on corporate boards: A review 
and research agenda". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 320-337. 
Todorova, G. and B. Durisin, 2007, "Absorptive capacity: Valuing a reconceptualization". 
Academy of Management Review, 32: 774-786. 
Torchia, M., A. Calabrò and M. Huse, 2011, "Women directors on corporate boards: From 
tokenism to critical mass". Journal of Business Ethics, 102: 299-317. 
Tortoriello, M., 2015, "The social underpinnings of absorptive capacity: The moderating 
effects of structural holes on innovation generation based on external knowledge". 
Strategic Management Journal, 36: 586-597. 
Tuschke, A., G. W. M. Sanders and E. Hernandez, 2014, "Whose experience matters in the 
boardroom? The effects of experiential and vicarious learning on emerging market entry". 
Strategic Management Journal, 35: 398-418. 
van Ees, H., J. Gabrielsson and M. Huse, 2009, "Toward a behavioral theory of boards and 
corporate governance". Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 307-319. 
van Ees, H., G. van der Laan and T. J. B. M. Postma, 2008, "Effective board behavior in the 
Netherlands". European Management Journal, 26: 84-93. 
Vandenbroucke, E., M. Knockaert and D. Ucbasaran, 2016, "Outside board human capital and 
early stage high‐tech firm performance". Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 40: 759-
779. 
Volberda, H. W., N. J. Foss and M. A. Lyles, 2010, "Absorbing the concept of absorptive 
capacity: How to realize its potential in the organization field". Organization Science, 21: 
931-951. 
Voordeckers, W., A. Van Gils, J. Gabrielsson, D. Politis and M. Huse, 2014, "Board 
structures and board behaviour: A cross-country comparison of privately held SMEs in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway". International Journal of Business Governance 




Walther, A., Morner, M. and A. Calabrò, 2017, "The role of behaviorally integrated 
nominating committees in non-executive director selection processes". European 
Management Journal, 35: 351-361. 
Westphal, J. D., 1999, "Collaboration in the boardroom: Behavioral and performance 
consequences of CEO-board social ties". Academy of Management Journal, 42: 7-24. 
Westphal, J. D., M.-D. L. Seidel and K. J. Stewart, 2001, "Second-order imitation: 
Uncovering latent effects of board network ties". Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 
717-747. 
Westphal, J. D. and E. J. Zajac, 2013, "A behavioral theory of corporate governance: 
Explicating the mechanisms of socially situated and socially constituted agency". The 
Academy of Management Annals, 7: 607-661. 
Whittington, R., A. Pettigrew, S. Peck, E. Fenton and M. Conyon, 1999, "Change and 
complementarities in the new competitive landscape: A European panel study, 1992–
1996". Organization Science, 10: 583-600. 
Zahra, S. A., I. Filatotchev and M. Wright, 2009, "How do threshold firms sustain corporate 
entrepreneurship? The role of boards and absorptive capacity". Journal of Business 
Venturing, 24: 248-260. 
Zahra, S. A. and G. George, 2002, "Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, and 
extension". Academy of Management Review, 27: 185-203. 
Zahra, S. A., D. O. Neubaum and M. Huse, 2000, "Entrepreneurship in medium-size 
companies: exploring the effects of ownership and governance systems". Journal of 
Management, 26: 947-976. 
Zahra, S. A. and J. A. Pearce, 1989, "Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: 
A review and integrative model". Journal of Management, 15: 291-334. 
Zattoni, A., L. Gnan and M. Huse, 2015, "Does family involvement influence firm 
performance? Exploring the mediating effects of board processes and tasks". Journal of 
Management, 41: 1214-1243. 
Zhang, P., 2010, "Board information and strategic tasks performance". Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 18: 473-487. 
Zona, F., 2016, "CEO leadership and board decision processes in family-controlled firms: 
Comparing family and non-family CEOs". Small Business Economics, 47: 735-753. 
 
